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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Get with the program 
How many times, in the course of the last year, has President Yel'tsin denied he 
intends to seek a third presidential term, then reversed himself a day or two later, 
hinting that he may stand for re-election? The first few times it happened, one 
could assume that his aides convinced him, after the initial statement, not to 
allow himself to be perceived as a lame duck and to keep people wondering if he 
might actually run. The possibility of a third term could serve to maintain Yel'tsin's 
political relevance, stifle the overt jostling for position among potential candidates 
and give subordinates an incentive to implement current presidential directives. 
 
If this has been the Kremlin's strategy, someone forgot to inform Deputy 
Administration Chief Igor Shabdurasulov. In an apparent attempt to emphasize 
his point that Yel'tsin should not consider running for office in the year 2000, 
Shabdurasulov committed a venal Kremlin sin by commenting on the president's 
health: "One cannot say that Yel'tsin's physical condition is ideal and that he is 
full of vigor and is absolutely fit for work around-the-clock." (Interfax, 0824 GMT, 
9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) While Shabdurasulov's comments only seem to 
reflect that which is obvious to even casual Kremlin observers, it represents quite 
a departure for so close an insider to make any negative remarks at all on 
Yel'tsin's health or work habits. It was, however, Shabdurasulov's advice to 
Yel'tsin that prompted the presidential press service to distance itself from the 
deputy chief. Yel'tsin, according to Shabdurasulov, should "complete building up 
the country over the next two years and then transfer power." No word as yet that 
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Shabdurasulov has been dismissed from Kremlin service, but he might be well-
advised to update his resume. 
 
APPARAT 
Shakhrai bounced from the court 
Longtime Yel'tsin loyalist Sergei Shakhrai was unceremoniously dumped as the 
presidential representative to the Constitutional Court on 29 June. (Interfax, 1352 
GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180) Returning to the position is Mikhail 
Mityukov, who held the post before Shakhrai. 
 
The dismissal was announced without comment, but likely explanations focus on 
the court's upcoming consideration of the Kremlin's petition for interpretation of 
Constitutional Article 81 Section 3, which may pave the way for a third Yel'tsin 
presidency. Some analysts believe that Shakhrai's recent support for presidential 
hopeful Yuri Luzhkov diminished his potential effectiveness as the advocate for 
Yel'tsin before the court. 
 
Shakhrai himself believes that it was the speech he gave to his PRES party 
convention the weekend before his dismissal that prompted the move. During the 
speech, Shakhrai commented on the impending presidential impeachment vote 
in the Duma, claiming that he believed there would be sufficient votes to bring it 
up for debate. It was this acknowledgment of reality that Shakhrai feels stirred up 
unwarranted animosity in the Kremlin. "A timely warning should be accepted with 
gratitude, not anger," he stated. (Interfax, 1438 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
180) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
IMF bailout agreement reached 
Russian government and IMF representatives have come to agreement on a 
multi-billion dollar bailout for the Russian economy. Announcement of the deal 
has already sparked increases to the Russian stock market. The deal, for a 
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reported $14.8 billion this year, with $7.8 billion more available down the line, 
was negotiated by Anatoli Chubais, who re-upped for government service in the 
wake of the current economic crisis. According to Chubais, the IMF bailout will 
alleviate the need for a ruble devaluation. (United Press International, 14 Jul 98; 
C-upi@clari.net) 
 
Rosneft update 
Still no takers for the Rosneft shares auction that seemed certain to spark a flurry 
of bids by high profile investors just last Spring. The continued decline in world oil 
prices have wreaked havoc in government plans to unload a major portion of the 
state oil firm. Perhaps the IMF stabilization funds will entice buyers back to the 
auction house. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Yel'tsin sets START-II as priority 
President Yel'tsin chaired a meeting of the Security Council on 3 July which dealt 
with issues concerning the country's strategic nuclear forces as well as the 
situation in the North Caucasus. During the meeting, President Yel'tsin reportedly 
set ratification of START-II as priority. (Interfax, 1138 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-184) 
 
FSB 
Details of Rokhlin murder 
The Federal Security Service has concluded that "the murder of Lev Rokhlin has 
no signs of a terrorist act related to an attempt on the life of a political figure or 
political reasons." (ITAR-TASS, 1353 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184) 
 
General Rokhlin was apparently killed with his own gun at his country house on 3 
July. His wife, who reportedly confessed to the killing, has been detained despite 
objections from the family that the confession was coerced. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Ray Gaul 
 
Polish-Russian summit a 'breakthrough' 
Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski viewed his recent visit to Moscow as a 
positive step toward better Russian-Polish relations. Kwasniewski expressed his 
optimism in an official statement to journalists following a 45-minute conversation 
with President Boris Yel'tsin on 29 June. Kwasniewski viewed the talks as a 
"breakthrough" and stated that "the talks with President Yel'tsin yielded much 
more than I expected." Among other issues discussed, the two agreed to take 
part in turn-of-the-century ceremonies at two sites containing the mass graves of 
Polish officers shot by the Soviet secret police in 1940. (PAP, 1310 GMT, 29 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-180) 
 
Is NATO an obstacle to Polish-Russian relations? 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, who has continually spoken out 
against further NATO expansion, does not view Poland only as a potential 
member of NATO. After his meeting with Polish President Kwasniewski, 
Primakov stated that "I would not look at our relations through the prism of 
NATO. We have many common interests." Kwasniewski said Russia accepted 
Poland's potential NATO membership, as evidenced by Yel'tsin's planned visit to 
Poland in December. (PAP, 0935 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181, and 
Interfax, 0929 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181) 
 
NATO membership for Russia? 
While emphasizing that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) should be the lead security organization in Europe, Primakov said that 
Russia might consider NATO membership if the conditions were right. During a 
speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 25 June, he 
said that Russia would join NATO if the alliance were transformed into a political 
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organization or if NATO in some way united with the OSCE. During his speech 
Primakov also reiterated Russian opposition to further NATO expansion 
eastward and to any expansion of NATO missions. (ITAR-TASS, 1821 GMT, 25 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) 
 
Russia welcomes Clinton veto 
Demonstrating its continued strong support for the Iranian government, Russia 
has publicly welcomed President Bill Clinton's veto of a bill that would have 
imposed tough sanctions on foreign firms which sell missile technology to Iran. A 
statement released by the Russian foreign ministry on 25 June stated that "this 
step by the American administration chief meets the spirit of Russian-American 
relations and the agreement reached between the presidents of Russia and the 
United States at their meeting in Birmingham in May." The Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran radio station also commented on the veto, viewing the action as 
a result of the importance the US attaches to its ties with Russia as well as a 
victory for Iran. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1130 GMT, 25 Jun 98; 
FBIS-NES-98-176, and Interfax, 1203 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175) 
 
Russian-Iraqi cooperation continues to strengthen 
Russia stands to be the biggest winner outside of Iraq if the oil embargo against 
the latter is fully lifted. Russia apparently is poised to deliver oil production 
equipment to Iraq as soon as the embargo ends. Following the passage of UN 
Security Council resolution 1175 on urgent measures for the rehabilitation of 
Iraq's oil infrastructure, a Russian foreign ministry statement addressed the need 
to coordinate promptly in the Committee on Sanctions practical matters 
connected with the transfer of oil equipment, also from Russia, to Iraqi territory. 
The focus of the UN resolution is to work towards raising Iraqi oil exports to $5.2 
billion within the next six months, the Russian foreign ministry said. (Interfax, 
1218 GMT, 23 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-174, and ITAR-TASS, 1012 GMT, 23 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-174) 
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Connected to this development, Moscow and Baghdad agreed on stronger 
cooperation in the framework of the UN aid program of oil-for-humanitarian-
goods during a 16-18 June meeting between Russia's presidential envoy to the 
Middle East, Viktor Posuvalyuk, and Iraq's vice chairman of the Revolution 
Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim. According to a Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman, "both sides expressed satisfaction with the growing involvement of 
Russian companies in the oil-for-humanitarian-goods formula." According to the 
official Iraqi news agency, during these consultations Izzat Ibrahim expressed the 
pride of Iraq's government and people in the stand taken by the Russian 
government, people, parties, and organizations in support of Iraq's efforts to have 
the embargo lifted. (INA, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-NES-98-169, and Interfax, 1647 GMT, 
22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) 
 
Primakov--Meritorious before the Motherland 
Yevgeni Primakov, the architect of Russia's multipolar foreign policy approach, 
received an award "For Merits before the Motherland" on 15 June. During the 
ceremony President Boris Yel'tsin honored the foreign minister for "defending 
Russia's interests across the world in a well respected and consistent manner." 
"Russia is rising, and Russia's authority throughout the world is increasing," 
Yel'tsin added. (Interfax, 1642 GMT, 15 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) 
 
Clinton to visit Moscow 
The Russian response to the announcement of President Bill Clinton's plans for a 
September visit to Moscow focused on reconfirming relations on a "partnership" 
basis. Foreign ministry official Vladimir Rakhmanin said "talks between the two 
presidents are expected to re-confirm the course for constructive interaction and 
commitment to relations on a partnership basis." Russian foreign ministry 
announcements emphasized a bilateral US-Russian relationship highlighting 
interaction in crisis settlement, a joint approach to international security and 
stability as well as the struggle against nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism 
and organized crime. According to Russian sources the specific agenda for the 
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summit will be worked on by Primakov and US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, who will meet in Manila at the end of July. (ITAR-TASS, 1628 GMT, 9 
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190, and Interfax, 1359 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) 
 
Agreement possible with Japan 
An agreement with Japan seems likely as increased diplomatic exchanges take 
place amidst growing economic cooperation. The Russian Duma set up a 
commission tasked with the duty of accelerating the ratification of an agreement 
once reached by the foreign ministry. This move indicates Duma support of 
efforts to normalize relations with Japan. Several breakthroughs were made prior 
to Prime Minister Kirienko's planned visit to Japan from 13-14 July. (Interfax, 
1035 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175) Agreements have been reached to 
guarantee investments made by both countries. Additionally, a Japanese 
delegation has visited the contentious Kurile islands and negotiations have 
begun on developing the islands. Moreover, a Japanese astronaut will train in 
Russia as part of an international effort to construct a space station. 
 
While serious differences remain unresolved, the latest developments show 
promise for future collaboration between Japan and Russia. Prospects for joint 
space projects appear rather good. Both countries are prepared to extend the 
current agreement on peaceful cooperation in outer space by five years. 
Additionally, guarantees for Japanese investors are likely to have a significant 
impact on bilateral relations. The economic benefits of such an agreement come 
at a time when both countries face financial difficulties. 
 
Relations with China improving 
Despite recent incidents concerning border agreements, Sino-Russian relations 
continue to improve. Progress has been made concerning cooperation on 
peaceful use of atomic energy between the two countries. At a five-member 
meeting in Almaty (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), 
Russian President Yel'tsin met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. The meeting 
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was held to discuss border issues but was extended to include regional security 
concerns and economic cooperation. (ITAR-TASS, 1412 GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-188) 
 
Additionally, Russian Prime Minister Kirienko planned to visit China in order to 
discuss economic concerns. On 14 July meetings with the prime minister of the 
Chinese State Council, Rongji Zhu, and President Jiang Zemin were scheduled. 
(Radio Rossii Network, 0800 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) Incidents on the 
Russian-Chinese border have caused a degree of tension between the countries, 
however, not to any great extent. In June, Russian border troops detained two 
infiltrators crossing from China into Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1117 GMT, 15 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-167) Earlier in June, relations became tense over a Chinese fish-
poaching incident. (See previous Editorial Digest.) Still, these events do not 
seem to have marred the diplomatic efforts at the highest levels. 
 
Diplomats expelled 
While relations with Japan and China seem to be on an upswing, the same 
cannot be said for South Korea. On 6 July, Moscow demanded the removal of a 
South Korean diplomat, Cho Sung Woo, who was declared persona non grata for 
spying. Angered by the indiscreet manner in which Russia handled the situation, 
Korea retaliated by proclaiming Russian diplomat Oleg Abramkin persona non 
grata on 8 July. 
 
South Korea claimed that Moscow should have engaged in consultations before 
making such an abrupt move. Meanwhile, Russia warned that South Korea's 
retaliation was uncalled for and that relations could deteriorate readily. (ITAR-
TASS, 0908 GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-187, and ITAR-TASS, 1211 GMT, 8 
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189). 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Russia may resume executions to cut costs 
The Duma has decided against discussing the bill that would have imposed a 
moratorium on capital punishment. Without further authorization, the present 
moratorium will presumably end. Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov confirmed 
that the number of people sentenced to death rises by about 150 every year, and 
four new high-security prisons will soon have to be built for them. This will cost 
the federal budget 580 million rubles, which, Nemtsov argues, the country just 
does not have. Budget consciousness is, of course, laudatory, but not when 
balanced upon the backs of prisoners condemned by a less-than-perfect judicial 
system. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 0900 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154) 
 
MEDIA 
New TV company to be registered in St. Petersburg 
Media outlets continue to proliferate. An open-type joint stock television and radio 
company called "Petersburg" will be registered within the next few days. The city 
of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region own controlling shares. Other investors 
include three commercial banks: Inkombank (the Invest-proyekt company with 14 
percent), Promstroybank of St Petersburg (the Promstroybank Property Fund 
company with 17.5 percent) and the Baltoneksimbank (the Baltoneksimkonsalt 
company with 17.5 per cent). (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1339 GMT, 16 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-170) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Division within the CPRF 
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The Russian Communist Party should seriously re-group, its leader Gennadi 
Zyuganov said in his report to the party. The party seems to have split into two 
camps: the fundamentalists, and the accommodationists. The fundamentalists 
brim with "revolutionary impatience," while the accommodationists believe the 
"that the masses are asleep" and so working within the system is necessary. 
 
Zyuganov noted that "attempts to split the party...are becoming stronger." Does 
this mean the eventual end to the CPRF? Probably not, but it may mean an end 
to the pretense of unity within the party. 
 
Zyuganov attempted to remedy the problem by calling for "an end to...attempts to 
split the party." In the fine democratic tradition of most communist parties, 
Zyuganov claimed that the party is not a "disputers' club" and all its members 
must abide resolutions coming from the leadership. 
 
It seems that he is trying to hold the party together by limiting membership, 
allowing in only the most convinced communists--read Zyuganov supporters. 
"We are not seeking to formally enlarge the party, the party needs qualitative 
changes in the social composition." In Zyuganov's words, the basic task is to 
make former enemies first sympathizers and then party supporters. 
 
Zyuganov may be attempting to undercut or dilute Seleznev's support, thereby 
capturing the party for himself; however, by choosing a "closed" party with limited 
membership over an "open" one, the CPRF may come to be perceived as a party 
out of touch with the average voter. (ITAR-TASS, 2126 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-171) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Ray Gaul 
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Momentum building in Abkhazia talks 
The month of June saw movement in discussions over the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict. The active personal involvement and shuttle diplomacy of CIS Executive 
Secretary Boris Berezovsky seems to have created a more cooperative 
atmosphere, at least on paper. Two draft agreements emerged from 
consultations in Sukhumi mediated by Berezovsky and Russian First Deputy 
Prime Minister Boris Patsukhov. The first document details a peace agreement 
between the two sides while the second establishes a protocol on the return of 
refugees to the Gali district. 
 
Even so, serious impediments remain to a finalized agreement. On 11 June, a 
helicopter piloted by CIS peacekeepers came under fire, raising concern that 
several factions will continue to undermine the negotiation process. Also, May 
clashes in the Gali district demonstrated the volatility of the situation. While 
Berezovsky's new role in the negotiations has been accepted by Georgian 
President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz leader Ardzinba, Russian leaders have 
attempted to undermine this role. The Russian Duma inflamed Georgian leaders 
by authorizing the establishment of separate negotiating channels in the peace 
settlements and by passing a 24 June resolution "[o]n normalizing the border and 
customs procedures on the Abkhazian section of the Russian-Georgian border." 
(Iprinda, 1251 GMT, 27 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-178) Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Yevgeni Primakov, while praising Berezovsky's economic policies, made 
clear that he does not approve of Berezovsky's efforts. He stated, " I think his 
main task should consist in concentrating efforts to build a layer of transnational 
entrepreneurial structures in the CIS countries." (ITAR-TASS, 1413 GMT, 25 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-177)  
 
CIS forum in St. Petersburg deemed successful 
On 17 June the second St. Petersburg economic forum, held in the Tavria 
Palace, began with a list of notable participants. CIS Executive Secretary 
Berezovsky, Russian Prime Minister Kirienko, and Belarusian President 
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Lukashenka all spoke at the plenary session. Berezovsky amused the audience 
by calling the CIS the "Commonwealth of Countries which are not rich." (ITAR-
TASS, 1037 GMT, 17 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-168) He reiterated his beliefs that 
the CIS should remain primarily an economic organization and that the best way 
to do so is to establish social stability in member countries. Lukashenka, while 
gaining applause, stated that the CIS was a "mirage." Meanwhile, Kirienko drew 
support for his proposal to establish an anti-crisis program to coordinate actions 
among member states in combating economic destabilization. Kirienko's 
proposal is an effort to soften the impact of the Asian crisis which had spillover 
effects in CIS member states. 
 
Yegor Stroev, chair of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, led the forum which 
was attended by over 2,500 prominent politicians, economists and scientists from 
all members of the commonwealth, as well as from 50 other countries. Leaders 
established numerous agreements on the implementation of investment projects. 
They also made recommendations on how to further economic integration, and 
promote social and cultural development in the commonwealth. Stroev stated the 
CIS would follow a unique model of integration, dissimilar from the European 
Union model or Chinese model. He said that different "roads of development 
could be mutually enhancing." He also stated his belief of foreign donor 
confidence in CIS countries' abilities to weather financial and political crises. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1323 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171) 
 
Berezovsky discusses Nagorno-Karabakh with leaders 
CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky signaled his intent to become actively 
involved in the resolution of all conflicts within the CIS by attending meetings with 
leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia from 21-22 June. Previously, he had 
concentrated primarily on the conflict in Abkhazia. However, new statements by 
Berezovsky in Baku indicate that his attention is spreading. He remarked that all 
conflicts within the CIS are interrelated and that they could not be solved 
independently. "The Commonwealth of Independent States can be effective only 
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if numerous conflicts in the territories of states, forming its space, are settled," he 
said. (ITAR-TASS, 1010 GMT, 21 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-172) He also expressed 
concern over a deterioration in affairs in southern Russia, indicating that he might 
propose a more comprehensive approach to peace in the Caucausus region 
which would include numerous parties. 
 
Chechnya pushes for CIS membership 
The Russian Duma invited a delegation from Chechnya for meetings in Moscow. 
A major topic of discussion concerned Chechnya's possible integration into the 
CIS. While Chechen leaders see this step as crucial in resolving outstanding 
issues between Chechnya and Russia, Duma leaders did not support the notion. 
Still, the fact that such issues were even discussed opens up the possibility that 
Russia might eventually allow Chechnya to establish some form of autonomous 
relationship within the CIS. (ITAR-TASS, 1502 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
181) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Monica Florescu 
 
MOLDOVA 
Renewed financial assistance expected from IMF 
On 18 June, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that it will resume 
financial assistance in the amount of $28 million to Moldova in October 1998, if 
Moldova shows signs of economic improvement in the financial, agricultural, and 
energy sectors. Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc stated that a harsh fiscal policy will be 
implemented for the next three months in order to meet the requirements put 
forth by the IMF. The promised loan is another installment from a total of $190 
million which the organization agreed to appropriate to Moldova. (Basapress, 
1910 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) In addition, the World Bank signed a 
credit agreement with Moldova on 23 June in which a program for further 
 14 
privatization of land and development of real estate was drafted. (Infotag, 1730 
GMT, 23 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-174) These agreements follow the installation of 
the new parliament in April and the selection of a new cabinet in June. Most 
importantly, they constitute a positive step towards building international 
organizations' confidence in Moldova's economic recovery. 
 
Transdniestr: Renewed efforts with dim signs of progress 
Six years after the armed conflict between Moldova and Transdniestr began, the 
peace process seems to be making progress--according to the Russains. The 
latest session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
held in Strasbourg on 22 June addressed the issue of the prolonged conflict. 
Aleksandr Sohin, Russian State Duma deputy chairman, stated that the Duma 
will vote to ratify the Moldova-Russia Treaty signed in October of 1992 regarding 
the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from Transdniestr. (Basapress, 1700 
GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-173) One week later, Russian President Yel'tsin 
officially confirmed Russia's commitment towards a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict, but made no mention of when the Duma will ratify the agreement. (Radio 
Rossii Network, 1800 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-180) 
 
In addition, on 1 July, Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi announced that his 
government is ready to accord Transdniestr the status of autonomy with a high 
degree of self-rule, similar to that of the autonomous region of Gagauz, provided 
that Moldova will remain united. He declared that the conflict should be resolved 
through administrative and territorial reforms, so as to decentralize power. 
However, the Transdniestrian side did not participate in the meeting held 
between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
Moldova from 1 July, a fact which demonstrates the obstacles that remain. 
(Interfax, 1512 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182) Finally, on 7 July, the Joint 
Control Commission (JCC), made up of representatives from Moldova, 
Transdniestr, and Russia, ruled that Transdniestr will reduce its peacemaking 
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forces in the security zone from 900 to 500 men by 8 July. (Basapress, 1920 
GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-182) 
 
UKRAINE 
Parliament concentrates on electing a speaker... 
After two months of parliamentary crisis in which no legislation had been passed, 
the Ukrainian Supreme Council finally chose its speaker. The main cause of the 
election stalemate had come from the center-right parliamentary groups, which 
blocked almost every attempt to elect a leftist speaker since the new parliament 
was elected. After the right-centrist faction boycotted the elections held on 26 
June, ex-speaker Oleksandr Moroz called for a closed session that was attended 
by all deputies in order to solve the problem of parliamentary deadlock. 
(Intelnews, 0141 GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) However, the next round 
of elections held on 3 July was again unsuccessful, as only 234 delegates 
participated in the voting. (Infobank, 1751 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184) The 
break in the crisis came only with the 7 July election when, of the 441 lawmakers 
who registered for the voting, 363 took ballots, and 314 voted. As a result of 
centrist deputies switching their support from the right to the left, Oleksandr 
Tkachenko, a member of the Left Center bloc and a leader of the Peasants' 
Party, was appointed speaker of parliament with a vote of 232 to 37 (45 ballots 
were declared invalid). (Interfax, 1226 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) 
 
...while Kuchma focuses on the economy 
President Leonid Kuchma signed a series of presidential decrees in order to 
overcome an economic crisis, while parliament was preoccupied for the past two 
months with electing a new speaker. (Infobank, 2023 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-169) The president's actions seemed to prevent an even greater crisis 
from occurring, as there had been talks of possibly dismantling the government 
altogether. 
 
Chernobyl faces technical and fiscal problems 
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The only generating unit still functioning (Unit 3) at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant was shut down on 16 June for repairs of a faulty turbo-generator and 
pipeline, which were caused by the idleness of the plant between July 1997 and 
May 1998. (Interfax, 1804 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) The shutdown 
lasted until 22 June, when the unit was reconnected with Ukraine's power grid. 
(Interfax, 1129 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) However, problems with the 
Chernobyl plant were not only technical in nature: An audit by the Ukrainian 
finance ministry found over 2,500 legal violations on 19 June. The report stated 
that almost 10 million hryvnyas from the Chernobyl Fund has been spent without 
authorization. (Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network, 0600 GMT, 19 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-171) 
 
These problems come at a time when the coal industry has been experiencing 
great difficulties, especially after the series of miners' protests and threats of 
shutting down the mines unless they are paid (see previous Editorial Digest). At 
the same time, authorities recently declared that the power industry is 
undergoing a deep and extended crisis: Customers simply do not pay for 94 
percent of their electricity. The debts make it difficult to maintain the level of 
safety imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Meanwhile, 
almost half of all electricity produced in Ukraine is generated by nuclear power 
plants. (NTV, 1000 GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183) 
 
BELARUS 
Foreign envoy crisis continues in Minsk 
In a "generous" effort to comply with the protests of the foreign ambassadors, the 
Belorusian authorities extended the deadline for leaving residences in the Drozdy 
compound from 10 June to 17 June (see previous Editorial Digest). On 19 June, 
a slightly more conciliatory move came from Belorusian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Nikolay Buzo, who allowed the diplomats to stay at Drozdy during the planned 
repairs. They were given special passes to get to their homes, as the property 
has just recently been declared a presidential estate. (Interfax, 1427 GMT, 19 
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Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170) However, the envoys who tried to return to their 
residences found no electricity, water, or telephones, and they had no access to 
their homes. In response, on 22 June the European Union ambassadors to 
Belarus returned to their capitals for "urgent consultations"; some even 
considered not returning to Minsk. In the end, they proved willing to resume 
dialogue with the Belorusian government, provided that the Vienna Convention 
accords were respected. (Belapan, 0205 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171) 
 
The Belorusian side accused the envoys of not complying with the Vienna 
Convention by their refusal to leave their residences after they were given an 
extra two weeks in which to vacate the area. The government considers the 
repairs to be within its rights, since only ambassadorial residences, not official 
buildings, are affected. (Belapan, 1448 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) In 
addition, President Lukashenka declared that the current crisis had been due to 
the West's reaction to Belarus' orientation towards union with Russia, and its 
opposition to NATO's expansion. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1905 GMT, 26 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) However, the Belorusian Supreme Soviet has blamed 
Lukashenka for not having shown more understanding toward the envoys' 
requests, as now the crisis may lead to the complete isolation of Belarus from the 
West and an even further reduction of foreign investment and trade. (Belapan, 
1710 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
DAGESTAN 
Magomedov reelected amid growing violence and tension 
On 25 June Dagestan's Constituent Assembly elected a State Council and 
reelected the incumbent State Council Chairman, Magomedali Magomedov. He 
 18 
received 162 of the 242 votes cast. (Interfax, 1049 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-176)  
 
Members of the assembly voted under very tense circumstances. Interior ministry 
troops sealed off the center of Makhachkala where soldiers with machine guns 
and grenade launchers guarded the government buildings. (NTV, 0600 GMT, 25 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) Since the attempted coup in May, explosions, 
assassinations, abductions and other acts of violence and terror have become 
increasingly frequent. In June alone, there were several attacks against military 
targets in Dagestan, including a helicopter division of the border troops, an 
OMON division and a military convoy. (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 Jun 98) (For 
more detail on the May coup attempt, see Editorial Digest, Vol. 3, No. 8.) 
 
The Constituent Assembly is composed of deputies from Dagestan's legislature 
and representatives of local and regional governments. In accordance with the 
1994 constitution, the process of choosing the highest republican executive 
authority is indirect and open to manipulation by the entrenched interests. 
Magomedov's critics charge that the existing system, managed through back 
room deals and intrigues, unfairly prohibits others from participating and 
perpetuates the corruption, poverty, and violence that has characterized 
Dagestani life in recent years. Various public figures, ranging from Nadir 
Khachilaev, the Duma deputy who led the May coup, to Ramazan Abdulatipov, 
the vice premier of the Russian government, have suggested that Dagestan 
would be better served by direct elections of a republican president. Some have 
conjectured that the two were working together. (Moskovskiye novosti, 24-31 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) 
 
Magomedov, a Dargin, has wielded political power in Dagestan since Soviet 
times and was elected chairman of the State Council in 1994. When his term 
expired in 1996 no elections were held due to the tensions and hardships caused 
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by the war in neighboring Chechnya. As a result, Magomedov has governed for a 
term of four years although he was elected for only two years in 1994. 
 
The constitution was amended on 19 March 1998 to make Magomedov's 
reelection possible. On that occasion the People's Assembly repealed Article 93 
of the constitution which prohibited persons of the same nationality from 
occupying the position of State Council chairman for two consecutive terms. (See 
Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov, "Rents in the Fabric of Government," 
Perspective, Vol. 8, No. 4, March-April 1998.) The original intention was to rotate 
the highest executive position among the deputies of the 14 constituent 
nationalities represented on the State Council. That provision was an important 
component of the delicate power balance among the different nationalities of 
Dagestan. Its repeal brought closer the danger of inter-ethnic strife. 
 
On the eve of the election Izvestia speculated that Magomedov would have been 
elected even under democratic procedures. The paper suggested that the 
majority of Dagestanis fear the militant tactics of the opposition more than they 
disapprove of the continuous decline of their republic under the existing 
leadership. That seems like a reasonable conclusion in view of all the violence 
that the republic has already endured and suggests that the refusal to hold 
national elections was extremely shortsighted. Little has been achieved other 
than the alienation of members of the opposition from the peaceful political 
process. 
 
GEORGIA 
After clashes in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze comes under increasing pressure  
The parties complied with the 25 May cease-fire agreement that ended several 
days of heavy fighting in the Gali region, but no progress was achieved on the 
repatriation of 35,000 Georgian refugees who fled the fighting. President Eduard 
Shevardnadze estimated that between 300 and 320 Abkhaz militants and 16 
members of the local Georgian militia were killed in the clashes. (ITAR-TASS, 
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1314 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-153) Georgian Prosecutor General Jamlet 
Babishvili said his investigation showed that 35 Georgian civilians and 17 
Georgian interior ministry staff were killed in the fighting and 1,695 deserted 
houses were razed in the Gali district. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1001 GMT, 6 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-157) 
 
As was the case on previous occasions, the Russian "peacekeepers" not only 
failed to do anything to curb the fighting in Gali but allowed the Abkhaz to bring 
heavy weapons into the demilitarized zone while denying similar advantages to 
the Georgians. Shevardnadze said that between 60-70 percent of the 
combatants were soldiers from "foreign countries" and suggested that the 14 
heavy military vehicles used in the latest attack belonged to the Russian military. 
(Iprinda, 0845 GMT, 8 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-159, and Interfax, 1200 GMT, 2 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) It appears that foreign combatants included not only 
Russians, but also Armenians, several of whom were killed in a mine explosion in 
June. (Iprinda, 1240 GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) In fact the local 
Armenians who had fought on the side of the Abkhaz were the subject of 
discussion between Armenian and Georgian representatives on 1 May. On that 
occasion Khosrov Arutyunian, chairman of the Armenian National Assembly, 
indicated that Armenia had little influence with those fighters. (Noyan Tapan, 1 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-124) 
 
Throughout June numerous Georgian politicians criticized Shevardnadze's failure 
to help the Georgian victims and home guards. On June 2, Akaki Asatiani, the 
leader of the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, called on Shevardnadze to 
resign. (Iprinda, 2 Jun 98, FBIS-SOV-98-153) On 10 June, a petition signed by 
2,000 refugees from Gali was presented to the president and the parliament; it 
called for the resignation of the government and the removal of Russian 
"peacekeepers." (Interfax, 1105 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-161) During the 
following week, two parties--the Georgian Socialist Party led by Vakhtang 
Rcheulishvili, and the Labor Party led by Shalva Natelashvili--declared a boycott 
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of the parliament. (Tbilisi Network, 0600 GMT, 15 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) On 
24 June, Aslan Abashidze, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ajaria, openly 
attacked Shevardnadze and Zurab Zhvaniya, the chairman of Georgia's 
parliament, for failing to pull Georgia out of the crisis. Abashidze called Zhvania 
"the source of all our misery" and the "enemy of Ajaria." (Iprinda, 1950 GMT, 24 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) Ajarian parliamentarians who are members of 
Abashizde's Revival party suspended their participation in the Georgian 
parliament. (Interfax, 1520 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175) 
 
On the diplomatic front neither CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky's nor 
Russian envoy Boris Pastukhov's mediation missions seemed to have produced 
any concrete results although drafts of a peace treaty and a protocol on refugee 
repatriation were discussed. Shevardnadze thanked the two mediators and 
indicated that he has had frequent conversations with Ardzinba; nevertheless, 
the positions of the sides remained unchanged. Shevardnadze had reiterated his 
offer of an "asymmetrical federation" in which South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 
Ajaria would have greater powers than other Georgian regions. He also said that 
he would meet with Abkhaz chief Ardzinba only after all the refugees were 
allowed to return. The Abkhaz side has suggested that the refugees could be 
repatriated over a period of one year and that the process would begin only in 
exchange for the relaxation of the trade restrictions on the Russian border. 
(Tbilisi Network, 0601 GMT, 29 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181, and ITAR-TASS, 
2218 GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170, and Interfax, 1613 GMT, 11 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-163) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Japan grants credits to Kazakhstan for airport modernization 
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At the end of June, the Japanese government granted privileged credit to 
Kazakhstan for the third time since the republic became independent. This credit 
is in the amount of 22.1 billion yen, and is designated to be used in the 
modernization of the new Kazakh capital's airport, which currently does not meet 
international safety standards. The loan is for a term of 30 years at a 2.2 percent 
interest rate, and the first repayment is due in 10 years. In addition to announcing 
the loan, the Japanese government also proclaimed its intention to provide 
further economic assistance to Kazakhstan in the future. (ITAR-TASS, 1018 
GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-181) 
 
Iran, Kazakhstan further expand economic ties 
On 26 June, the co-chairmen of the Kazakh-Iranian Commission for Trade, 
Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation, Erkin Kaliev (Kazakh 
minister of transport and communications) and Eshaq Jahangiri (the Iranian 
minister of mines and metals) signed a memorandum of understanding in 
Astana. The two countries agreed to establish jointly a sea and rail transport 
company, and the Iranian government declared its willingness to recommence 
the transport of Kazakh oil to the world market via Iran (IRNA, 0717 GMT, 26 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-177), although Minister Jahangiri did not actually set a date for 
the oil transport's resumption. Kazakh Prime Minister Balgymbaev also invited 
the Iranian government to invest in the renovation and modernization of 
Kazakhstan's newly inaugurated capital city, Astana. (IRNA, 1115 GMT, 24 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-175) 
 
Prime Minister Balgymbaev and Minister Jahangiri met on 24 June, and in 
addition to oil transportation issues, their discussion focused on an agreement to 
provide Iran with Kazakh grain supplies. The Kazakh Food Contract Corporation 
has already completed its first shipment of 100,000 tons of grain to Iran (Interfax, 
1520 GMT, 24 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-175), and although details of the 
agreement itself have not been released, it is likely that more shipments will 
follow this one. 
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TAJIKISTAN 
Dispute over religious parties law appears to have been resolved 
One day after the deadline set for the Conciliation Commission to submit its 
proposals to the president, Ibragim Usmonov, a member of the commission and 
chairman of the parliament's Committee for International Affairs, Inter-ethnic 
Relations and Culture, discussed the commission's work in an interview with 
ITAR-TASS. Usmonov reported that a compromise version of the law had been 
adopted in order to permit the establishment of political parties which are based 
on religion. Abdulmajid Dostiev, the chairman of the commission and first 
speaker of the Tajik National Parliament, had officially submitted the revised law 
to President Rahmonov. (ITAR-TASS, 1535 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) 
 
On 20 June, in a meeting with the UN secretary-general's special envoy, Jan 
Kubis, United Tajik Opposition (UTO) chairman Said Abdullo Nuri gave further 
details of the Conciliation Commission's proposal. He informed Kubis that Article 
Four of the law on political parties was changed to state that, although the 
formation of political parties which are religiously based is to be allowed, these 
parties will not be permitted to accept support from religious organizations. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1605 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-171) 
 
Comment 
The difference between these two versions of the law on political parties is so 
subtle as to be nearly nonexistent, and leads directly to the question of how, or 
even whether, Tajik law currently differentiates between religious organizations 
and political parties which are based on religion. If there is no legal definition of 
either term, then it is more than likely that the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)--
Said Abdullo Nuri and Ali Akbar Turajonzoda's party, and the strongest force in 
the UTO--will meet with many more obstacles as the parliamentary elections 
approach. 
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The recent conflict over the political parties law passed by the Tajik parliament at 
the end of May, in addition to highlighting the serious rifts that still exist between 
the UTO and President Rahmonov's administration, also illustrate clearly the 
weaknesses in the inter-Tajik peace agreement. The agreement calls for actions 
which are not sanctioned by Tajikistan's current body of laws (many of which 
date back to Soviet days). Furthermore, it is not absolutely clear whose decisions 
carry more weight--the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), or the Tajik 
parliament. The NRC is indeed responsible for proposing amendments to 
Tajikistan's election laws, but the peace agreement does not state whether it is 
necessary for the legislature to accept these proposals in order for them to 
become law, and what steps should be taken if the legislature rejects any of the 
NRC's suggestions. 
 
In other Central Asian republics, the president has sufficient authority to order the 
legislature to accept certain measures. Whether this is also the case in 
Tajikistan, President Rahmonov has thus far refrained from exerting pressure on 
the Tajik parliament to accept the NRC's proposals, or to keep its actions in line 
with the terms of the peace agreement. But then President Rahmonov himself 
seems reluctant to carry out the requirements of the peace agreement's political 
protocol. 
 
NRC, government increase support for refugees' repatriation 
As refugees of Tajikistan's recently ended civil war continue to return to their 
home towns and villages, the NRC Subcommission on Refugees and the Tajik 
government are being called upon to provide more financial and material support 
to those areas which are receiving the largest influx. The government pledged to 
grant each returning refugee family 25,000 Tajik rubles, but there have been 
many complaints that these funds are not being fairly distributed. Members of the 
NRC Subcommission on Refugees have decided to visit the towns to which most 
of the refugees have been returning in order to investigate these reports. (Voice 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) 
 25 
 
Thousands of refugees have already returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Approximately 2,000 persons were repatriated to 
the District of Tavil-Dara and to the Sagirdasht state farm in the District of Darvoz 
by May. (Radio Tajikistan Network, 0800 GMT, 6 Jan 97; FBIS-SOV-98-175) In 
an interview with the Daydzhest Press (a newspaper published in Dushanbe) in 
mid-June, Rizoqul Juraev, a deputy chief of the Regional Committee for 
Refugees in Khatlon Oblast', reported that nearly all those who had fled Khatlon 
Oblast' during the war had returned. Juraev stated that 107,129 families had 
returned, out of the 109,000 which had left prior to December 1996. In Juraev's 
judgment, the main problem facing the refugees is a lack of housing. During the 
war, 44,260 houses were destroyed in Khatlon Oblast', and thus far only 24,000 
have been rebuilt. Many refugees' homes that were left undisturbed were 
appropriated by other families; 9,000 of these houses have been returned to their 
rightful owners (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 GMT, 17 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-171), but there are undoubtedly many more cases in which the 
new owners refuse to vacate the refugees' residences. 
 
UTO troops begin returning from Afghanistan 
On 1 July the first group of UTO troops was finally allowed to begin crossing from 
Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The first group is comprised of approximately 150 
men who had been waiting in the northern Afghan border town of Shir Khan, and 
were to enter Tajikistan via the Panj-i Poyon (in Russian, Nizhny Poyon) border 
post. UN military observers supervised the operation, with the assistance of the 
Russian border patrol stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border and CIS 
peacekeeping units (many of whom are also stationed on the Tajik-Afghan 
border). The returning UTO troops were to be escorted to temporary quarters in 
eastern Tajikistan. Their weapons and ammunition were to be transported 
separately by members of the CIS peacekeeping forces. (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 0803 GMT, 1 Jul 98; FBIS-UMA-98-182) 
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UTO chairman does not intend to seek the presidency 
In an interview with Ordo, a Kyrgyz newspaper, UTO Chairman Said Abdullo 
Nuri, who also holds the post of chairman of the National Reconciliation 
Commission, stated that he has no desire to run for office when Tajikistan's first 
post-war presidential elections are held. (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 21 May 98, p. 3; 
FBIS-SOV-98-161) Nuri has held the highest office within the UTO since the 
organization was formed in early 1994. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Further progress made on Turkmen-Pakistan pipeline route 
After a number of negotiation sessions held between Taleban and anti-Taleban 
leaders and mediated by the Central Asian Gas Pipeline Company, the two sides 
have agreed to sign protocols guaranteeing the security of the pipeline itself, as 
well as of the Turkmen, Afghan, and Pakistani workers who will be engaged in 
building the pipeline. 
 
The protocols also set out labor conditions for the workers. The protocols will be 
submitted for ratification to the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan in August, in the hope that pipeline construction can begin before the 
end of this year. (Interfax, 1601 GMT, 13 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-164) 
 
US, UK-Chinese firms win tenders to Serdar, Gaplan oil fields 
On 16 June, Turkmenistan's Competent Body for the Use of Hydrocarbons 
announced that the US company Mobil and a joint British-Chinese company, 
Kern Energy-Texuna, have won exploration and development rights to two 
offshore oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea. Mobil is to develop the 
Serdar oil field (currently the subject of a territorial dispute between Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan), which is believed to hold 150 million to 200 million tons of oil 
and little or no natural gas. Kern Energy-Texuna won the right to the Gaplan field, 
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which contains an estimated 88 million tons of oil and 132 billion cubic meters of 
gas. 
 
The companies will not be able to actually begin exploring the fields for another 
few months, as they must first negotiate production-sharing agreements with the 
Turkmen government. (Interfax, 1609 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167)  
 
Turkmenistan, Iran to permit 24-hour border crossings at Bajgiran 
The Iranian governor-general of Khorasan Province, Mohsen Mehr-'Alizadeh, 
announced on 24 June that, as of 1 July, Turkmen and Iranian citizens would be 
permitted to travel across the border between the two countries at the Bajgiran 
border post (in the Iranian province of Khorasan, 210 km northwest of Mashhad) 
at any time of day. This agreement seems to have resulted from the increase in 
traffic across this border post since visa requirements for entering either country 
were lifted on 22 May in order to facilitate pilgrimages to Muslim holy sites (in 
both Iran and Turkmenistan) and tourist trips. (IRNA, 1346 GMT, 24 Jun 98; 
FBIS-NES-98-175) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
The pen is mightier than the sword for NATO inclusion 
Despite repeated assurances from Baltic spokesmen that the Baltic battalion is 
prepared for its first international mission, a Finnish newspaper recently 
published a bleak evaluation of the battalion's readiness. In response to 
Norway's suggestion that BaltBat be sent to perform UN peacekeeping duties in 
place of Norwegian troops, Helsingen Sanomat reported that training exercises 
held in the fall of 1997 proved the troops were nowhere near able to serve as an 
independent unit. The chief shortcoming apparently is linguistic: Proficiency in 
English, the essential language for international operations (and the language of 
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command in NATO), is "very weak in the battalion as a whole," the paper 
reported. (Helsingen Sanomat, internet version, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-WEU-98-160) 
 
Lack of proficiency in English is not an insignificant hurdle. The ability to 
communicate with other countries is far more important than a country's arsenal 
to Baltic aspirations to join NATO, according to Javier Solana, secretary-general 
of the alliance. "Absence of modern intricate weaponry is not the main problem. 
One must develop the capacity of cooperation, language skills, skills of 
communication with people and management techniques," Solana is quoted as 
saying during his visit to Estonia. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 
19 Jun 98) The Baltic governments apparently were not surprised by indications 
of deficiencies. Just days before Solana reached Riga, the Latvian government 
resolved to raise defense funding to 1 percent of the country's GDP in 1999 and 
to increase the portion gradually to 2 percent by 2003. The current defense 
budget amounts to .67 percent of GDP. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 
GMT, 16 Jun 98) Moreover, President Valdas Adamkus voiced his recognition of 
the Lithuanian military's need to improve its ability to cooperate with others. 
During a meeting at defense headquarters, Adamkus noted the necessity for 
officers to intensify English-language education and to create NATO-level 
training programs. (ELTA, 1439 GMT, 25 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-176) 
 
LATVIA 
Fatherland faction hurls another wrench into citizenship machinery... 
The sigh of relief heard on 22 June when the Latvian parliament granted final 
approval to changes to the country's citizenship law turned quickly into a groan, 
as the For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party began gathering signatures 
to postpone publication of the amendments for two months and to bring about a 
referendum on the subject. 
 
As reported in earlier digests, several leaders of the international community had 
weighed in with support for the changes; by the end of the May no external 
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voices were heard in favor of maintaining the legal status quo. As the 
parliamentary session neared the scheduled summer recess without the final 
reading of the bill, the last wrench was turned: While on the Latvian leg of his visit 
to the Baltic states, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana did not issue the 
expected reassurance of NATO's doors remaining open to all candidates as he 
had in Lithuania. Instead, during a press conference at the end of his stay in the 
Latvian capital, Solana stated that he hoped the Saeima would pass 
amendments to the citizenship law in the final reading. (Baltic News Service, 
1600 GMT, 18 Jun 98) 
 
The amendments which envisage abolition of naturalization quotas and the 
granting of citizenship to children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991did pass 
during a special session, with a vote of 42 for, 26 against, and 7 abstaining. 
(Radio Riga, 1700 GMT, 22 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) Before the vote on the 
amendments was taken, Prime Minister Guntars Krasts advised MPs that the 
constitution provided an opportunity to organize referenda to decide crucial 
issues. Given Latvia's domestic and international situation, he said, the 
citizenship issues could be passed for broad public assessment. (Baltic News 
Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 22 Jun 98) Once the vote was taken, the For 
the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party immediately began to gather signatures 
calling for such a referendum. The petition was submitted to President Ulmanis 
on 26 June, with the backing of 38 Saeima deputies. (Radio Riga Network, 1700 
GMT, 26 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-177) To stage the referendum, one-tenth of 
voters (approximately 133,000 persons) must support the idea. (Baltic News 
Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 30 Jun 98) Signatures will be collected from 20 
July to 18 August. 
 
After the Saeima vote Vitaly Makarov, spokesman for the Russian foreign 
ministry, said that the amendments still did not meet fully the recommendations 
of OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Max van der Stoel. 
Apparently, the foreign ministry misread either the amendments or the 
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recommendations: A press statement by van der Stoel said the 
recommendations had been met. (Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 24 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-175) 
 
...as language issue moves to education arena 
While children born on independent Latvian soil may escape having to pass 
language exams in order to gain citizenship, teachers at Russian-language 
schools learned they would be expected to show a proficiency in Latvian by 
September. According to Minister of Education and Science Janis Gaigals, the 
requirement is aimed at furthering the integration of all into Latvian society. 
(Radio Riga Network, 1300 GMT, 18 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-169) The day after 
Gaigals' announcement, Radio Riga reported that about 50 persons "with posters 
and placards in incorrect Latvian" were protesting outside the ministry. (1100 
GMT, 19 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-170) 
 
Relations with Russia remain bad for the long haul 
Latvia has been the recipient of an incredible amount of pressure from the 
international community on the matter of citizenship eligibility, much to Russia's 
delight. However, while discussions raged over the citizenship bill and other 
language issues, Latvia signaled its willingness to go on the offensive. In a 
symbolic gesture of defiance, the Saeima trotted out an old standby sure to ignite 
Russian ire: a parliamentary resolution to acquaint the international community 
with the declaration on Latvian occupation. The declaration itself, which was 
adopted in August 1996, calls on foreign countries to help remove the 
consequences of the Soviet occupation and denounces the incorporation of the 
Abrene district into Russia in 1944. Shortly after the declaration's initial adoption, 
it was criticized and termed a provocation by Russia. Under the recent resolution, 
the declaration has to be disseminated as a United Nations document. (Baltic 
News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 11 Jun 98) The recent resolution 
prompted yet another spate of sharp words between the two foreign ministries. 
(Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1800 GMT, 17 Jun 98) 
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Words are not the only weapons being wielded. Although Russia continues to 
deny that it has placed economic sanctions on Latvia, Latvian truckers report 
incredible difficulties in obtaining entry permits for Russia. Over 1700 hauler 
companies are having trouble buying single-entry permits to Russia for the 
stipulated price of $250. (Radio Riga, 1300 GMT, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-173) 
Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin explained that "Russia 
opposes economic sanctions." The cancellation of discounts on international 
carriage of most freight going to Latvia, effective 1 July, was simply meant "to 
streamline trade and economic relations with Latvia," he said. (Interfax, 1147 
GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183) Apparently trade with Lithuania is already 
streamlined. At the same time that the number of permits available to Latvian 
truckers is decreasing, the total granted to their Lithuanian counterparts is 
increasing. The Russian transportation ministry has granted Lithuanian haulers 
an additional 8,000 permits for shipping international freight, according to 
government officials in Vilnius. (Baltic News Service, 1000 GMT, 25 Jun 98) 
 
ESTONIA 
Government demonstrates disoriented foreign policy 
Rumblings from Russia seem to indicate that Estonia is next on the list for 
pressure to be exerted. However, government leaders in Tallinn seem intent on 
proving that relations with the east are not their uppermost concern. The 
Riigikogu voted to postpone the second reading of amendments to Estonia's 
citizenship law until after the summer recess. As in Latvia, the amendments 
would grant almost automatic citizenship to children born on independent 
Estonian soil. (Baltic News Service, 1000 GMT, 18 Jun 98) The amendments, 
submitted at the end of 1997, fall in line with OSCE recommendations and a 
convention on the rights of children accepted by the European Union and the 
Council of Baltic Sea States. 
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Moreover, in a bizarre demonstration of what can at best be termed diplomatic 
naivete, Estonia's foreign minister, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, gave some astonishing 
answers according to an interview published in the The Ottawa Citizen. When 
asked about Estonian-Russian relations, Ilves responded: "The Russians are a 
pain in the ass. They've never gotten over their post-colonial stress 
syndrome...But the empire's gone, baby--and you have to get used to that." (The 
Ottawa Citizen, 8 Jun 98, p. B4; NEXIS) Not surprisingly, Vladimir Rakhmanin, a 
spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry, did not take kindly to Ilves' "outright 
antipathy" and word choice. An official of the foreign ministry press service 
quoted Ilves as saying that certain Canadian media had misrepresented his 
remarks. (Interfax, 1802 GMT, 16 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-167) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Brazauskas reports belief he was under watch 
In the continuing saga of the Third Unit surveillance scandal, the chairman of the 
special parliamentary commission established to investigate this issue has been 
unable to find sufficient evidence that high-ranking state officials had been the 
victim of surveillance by the recently disbanded unit. However, former president 
Algirdas Brazauskas recently announced that he believed he had been under 
surveillance. "Certain words or even entire sentences which I said in my office 
were quoted in conversations with other officials," Brazauskas told Lietuvos rytas. 
The former president has been invited by parliament to give more precise 
testimony about his claim. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1000 GMT, 17 Jun 
98) Seimas Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis denied he knew the details of last 
year's confidential conversation between Brazauskas and fellow presidential 
candidate Arturas Paulauskas to which Brazauskas referred in the newspaper 
interview and said that statements he made that mirrored that conversation were 
just a lucky guess. "After the press reported about the August 15 meeting 
between above-mentioned persons last year, just days after it, Landsbergis told a 
news conference he reckoned they talked about the forthcoming presidential 
elections, final goals, and ways to achieve them by using joint and tuned tactics," 
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a spokesman for Landsbergis said. (ELTA, 1600 GMT, 30 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
181) 
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